Phd in Economics and Organization // Alessandro Tavoni // alessandro.tavoni@unive.it // venus.unive.it/alessandro.tavoni // skype // Fax: +39.041.2349176 // Mobile: +39.333.3373434

 




Department of Economics
Ca' Foscari University of Venice

Cannaregio 873, 30121 Venice, Italy

PhD in Economics
Director:Agar Brugiavini

Secretary: Marni Wood
T +390412349125
F +390412349176
sse@unive.it

 

ALESSANDRO TAVONI, Ph.D. in Economics

ale

Postdoc at London School of Economics

Ph.D. from Advanced School of Economics at the University of Venice "Ca' Foscari"

Feem Junior Researcher, Coalitions & Networks for International Environmental Agreements

ZEW Fellow in Environmental and Resource Economics

a.tavoni@lse.ac.uk , skype

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2010 Sep - current - Postdoc at London School of Economics

2010 Mar-Jun - Research Fellow at ZEW (Centre for European Economic Research)

2008-2009 - Visiting research collaborator at Princeton's Levin Lab and Autonoma University of Barcelona

October 09 - Co-organizer: International Workshop on Fairness and the Commons - Socio-economic Strategies and Resource Dynamics

Research

Fields: behavioral game theory and experimental economics; evolutionary dynamics and the evolution of norms; fairness motives and other-regarding preferences

“Inequality, communication and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game", with A. Dannenberg, G. Kallis z; and A. Loeschel.

International efforts to provide global public goods often face the challenges of coordinating
national contributions and distributing costs equitably in the face of uncertainty, inequality, and
free-riding incentives. In an experimental setting, we distribute endowments unequally among a
group of people who can reach a fixed target sum through successive money contributions, knowing
that if they fail they will lose all their remaining money with 50% probability. In some treatments
we give players the option to communicate intended contributions. We find that inequality reduces
the prospects of reaching the target, but that communication increases success dramatically. Successful
groups tend to eliminate inequality over the course of the game, with rich players signaling
willingness to redistribute early on. Our results suggest that coordination-promoting institutions
and early redistribution from richer to poorer nations are both decisive for the avoidance of global
calamities such as disruptive climate change.

"When fairness bends rationality: incorporating inequity aversion in models of regretful and noisy behavior"

Presented at CTN, Maastricht (2009)

Forthcoming, Journal of Theoretical Biology

"The survival of the conformist: equity-driven ostracism and renewable resource management", with M.Schlute and S.A.Levin

Professors' links

Simon Levin Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University
Christina Tonitto Department of Horticulture, Cornell University
Massimo Warglien Department of Business Economics & Management, University of Venice Ca' Foscari
Jeroen van den Bergh Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Venice Ca' Foscari
Bronwyn Hall Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley
Carlo Carraro Department of Economics, University of Venice Ca' Foscari and FEEM